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ADMIRALTY-UNSEAWORTHINESS-RECOVERY FOR INJURIES RESULTING FROM 
CONDITION A.ru:sING AFTER COMMENCEMENT OF THE VOYAGE - Plaintiff, a 
member of the crew of a fishing vessel, sustained injuries while disembark-
ing when he slipped on a slimy substance on the ship railing. In an action 
brought against the shipowner, the seaman sought recovery on three alter-
native grounds: first, under the Jones Act1 based upon negligence; second, 
under general maritime law based upon the obligation of the shipowner 
to furnish a seaworthy vessel; third, under general maritime law for main-
tenance and cure.2 Judgment was entered pursuant to a verdict limiting 
the seaman to recovery for maintenance and cure.3 On the seaman's appeal 
from the adverse verdict on the unseaworthiness count, held, affirmed. A 
shipowner is not liable for injuries to a seaman caused by a condition of 
unseaworthiness arising after commencement of the voyage where in the 
exercise of due care there would be no opportunity for the shipowner or 
138 Stat. 1185 (1915), 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. (1952) §688. With respect to 
the relative importance of the Jones Act remedy, see note 5 infra. 
2 Maintenance and cure is not a general compensatory remedy. Generally, it is 
limited to medical care, living expenses during the period of recuperation, and wages 
during the duration of the voyage, if employed on ocean-going vessels, or the remainder 
of the contract term for employment in coastal trade. See GILMORE AND BLACK, ADMIRALTY 
265-271 (1957). The obligation of maintenance and cure apparently does not extend to a 
lump-sum or installment payment for partial or total disability. See Farrell v. United 
States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949), where maintenance and cure was terminated on the ground 
that a maximum cure had been realized (i.e., the patient was declared incurable). See 
GILMORE AND BLACK, ADMIRALTY 264 (1957). 
8 Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., (D.C. Mass. 1958) 167 F. Supp. 434. 
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tmployees to observe and remove the condition. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, 
Inc., (1st Cir. 1959) 265 F. (2d) 426, cert. granted 80 S.Ct. 70 (1959). 
While the right of a seaman under American law to recover for unsea-
worthiness can be traced to The Osceola,4 the earliest authoritative recog-
nition that the exercise of due care did not relieve a shipowner of liability 
for unseaworthiness appears to be Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co.IS 
Although the suggestion has been considered dictum because of the pres-
ence of negligence in the latter case,6 the Supreme Court was squarely con-
fronted with the issue in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki7 where the inability 
to detect a defective condition by visual inspection8 or other reasonable 
means available to a shipowner was held .no bar to a worker's recovery for 
unseaworthiness. In Sieracki, the Court was influenced by the consideration 
that it would be too harsh to require the individual seaman to bear the 
entire cost of the injury where the shipowner could either absorb the loss 
or with relative ease spread the cost among customers.9 The further de-
velopment of the trenq, established in Mahnich and Sieracki continued10 
until Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., where the Court permitted a 
seaman who was injured in an assault by another crewman to recover for 
unseaworthiness although there was no showing that the shipowner had 
prior notice of the crewman's vicious disposition.11 This result seems to 
follow as a logical development from Sieracki, for if the latent nature of the 
defect does not preclude recovery for unseaworthiness, the lack of notice as 
to the dangerous tendencies of a crewman should not bar recovery. Thus, 
within eleven years, the Mahnich suggestion apparently materialized into 
a well-settled doctrine that the shipowner constituted an insurer for sea-
man's injuries resulting from an unseaworthy condition. Strict liability 
has been defended on the traditional ground that the seaman is a "ward of 
4189 U.S. 158 (1903). See, generally, GILMORE AND BLACK, ADMIRALTY 315 (1957): 
Tetreault, "Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harbor Workers," 39 CoRN. L. Q. 
381 at 386 (1954). 
IS 321 U.S. 96 (1944). Because proof of negligence is required to sustain recovery 
under the Jones Act, the developments •from Mahnich have caused such a rapid decline 
in the usefulness of the Jones Act remedy that one writing team was prompted to predict 
that it would soon become a "faint and ghostly echo." GILMORE AND BLACK, ADMIRALTY 
316 (1957). 
6 The mate negligently selected a rope to hang a staging, the collapse of which 
caused the seaman's injuries. 
7 328 U.S. 85 (1946). 
s The injury resulted from a boom and tackle which fell because of a shackle which 
broke due to a defect in forging. 
-9 See also Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., (2d Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 515. Cf. 
Justice Holmes' concurring opinion in The Arizona Employer Liability Cases, 250 U.S. 
400 at 431 (1919). -
10 Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., (9th Cir. 1953) 205 F. (2d) 478, alfd. per curiam 347 
U.S. 396 (1954). 
11348 U.S. 336 (1955). See also Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., note 9 supra: 
Jones v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., (2d Cir. 1953) 204 F. (2d) 815. 
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the admiralty."12 This attitude, which has been manifested by legislatures 
as well as the judiciary, is supported by several considerations.13 The rigors 
of maritime service include the performance of hard labor under hazardous 
conditions and isolation from friends and home life for extended periods 
of time which often results in boredom and dissatisfaction. Also, like most 
industrial workers in an age of increasing technology, seamen are frequently 
unable to evaluate critically the safety of their working conditions. Even 
if deficiencies are discovered by the seaman, effective protests may be lim-
ited by the possibility of harsh treatment from the mate and the physical 
restriction of sea duty which prevents a seaman from leaving his job. Rec-
ognizing the public interest in the full development of the national mari-
time industry, courts and legislatures have generally tried to encourage the 
entrance of qualified men into the vocation. In view of these considerations 
and the absorption-of-loss factor noted in Sieracki, the imposition of strict 
liability on shipowners for unseaworthiness appears desirable.14 Indeed, 
reliance on these considerations suggests a parallel with the development 
of absolute liability in the field of workmen's compensation. Nevertheless, 
in the principal case the First Circuit15 challenges the general development 
of strict liability for unseaworthiness, pointing out that none of the prior 
cases have involved a temporary condition of unseaworthiness arising after 
commencement of the voyage.16 The court complains that it would be a hard 
doctrine which holds a shipowner liable for injuries resulting from the pres-
ence of a transitory substance before the owner or his employees have an op-
portunity to discover and remove the substance.17 But this reluctance on the 
part of the court is questionable since there appears to be no significant 
difference between cases involving an absence of opportunity to detect and 
remove a transitory substance and those involving an absence of notice as 
to dangerous propensities of a crewman or other defects which can not be 
12 Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., note 5 supra, at 103; Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 
note 7 supra. 
13 See, generally, Norris, "The Seaman as Ward of the Admiralty," 52 MICH. L. REv. 
479 (1954). 
14 The policy considerations enumerated in this note are premised on limitation 
of the use of unseaworthiness to seamen and closely related classes of workers. In general, 
the Supreme Court has limited the remedy to seamen and those classes of workers who 
perform tasks traditionally assigned to seamen. Recovery for unseaworthiness was 
permitted in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, note 7 supra (longshoreman), and Pope &: 
Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953) (carpenter repairing unloading facilities). Re-
covery was denied in United New York and New Jersey Sandy Hook Pilots Assn. v. 
Halecki, 358 U.S. 613 (1959) (subcontractor employee overhauling the vessel's generator), 
and Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959) (social 
visitor). 
15 In Doucette v. Vincent, (1st Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 834, the First Circuit cited with 
apparent satisfaction the line of authority developing from Mahnich. 
16 Principal case at 432. 
17Ibid. 
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detected by the exercise of due care.18 Moreover, acceptance of the transi-
tory unseaworthiness distinction, which is little more than factual in nature, 
seems to be inconsistent with the sound policy which dictates that the unsea-
worthiness concept be equated with strict liability. 
John L. Peschel 
18 See Poignant v. United States, (2d Cir. 1955) 225 F. (2d) 595; GILMORE AND BLACK, 
ADMIRALTY 332 (1957). But see Dixon v. United States, (2d Cir. 1955) 219 F. (2d) 10; 
Cookingham v. United States, (3d Cir. 1950) 184 F. (2d) 213, cert. den. 340 U.S. 935 (1951). 
